Oil Rents And Democracy In Iran

1997-2010: Re-Visiting The Rentier

State Theory by Najdi, Youhanna
 OIL RENTS AND DEMOCRACY IN IRAN        
1997-2010: RE-VISITING THE RENTIER      
STATE THEORY 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
 
 
 
YOUHANNA NAJDI 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
May 2015 
ii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
In the name of GOD 
 
This research project would not have been possible without the support of 
many people. Firstly, I would like to specifically thank my supervisor, Dr. Reevany, 
who is a good friend and was always willing to help me and give me the best 
suggestions. His guidance helped me throughout the entire the time of writing this 
thesis. I would also like to thank my co-supervisor, Dr. Benny, for his advice to 
improve my thesis.  
Besides my supervisor, I would also like to thank my thesis committee, Dr. 
Azeem, Dr. Zaini, and Prof. Datuk. Qasim for their encouragement, insightful 
comments and hard questions. My sincere and special gratitude also for Dr. Azeem, 
for his continuous support of my thesis, as well as his patience, motivation, 
enthusiasm, and immense knowledge. Also, I would like to express my gratitude to 
my previous supervisor, Prof. Mohd Azhari Bin Abdul Karim for his patience and 
providing me with a good atmosphere for conducting research.  
I would also like to thank Prof. Solvay Gerke who supported me throughout 
this entire process. Although officially she was not responsible for my thesis, every 
time I knocked on the door of her office with many questions, I always left with 
many new, inspired ideas. Furthermore, I would also like to thank my wife, Dr. 
Yalda Davoudpour. She was always there cheering me up and stood by me through 
the good times and bad.  
A special thanks to my mother for her endless love and affection, never ceasing 
even from thousands of kilometres away. Also, the memory of my father has strongly 
inspired me to further my education, although unfortunately he is not among us now. 
The author also wishes to express his love and gratitude to his beloved family, my 
iii 
 
older sister, and her husband who were always supporting me and encouraging me 
with their best wishes. Last but not least, many thanks to the CenPRIS and its calm 
atmosphere. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................... ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... iv 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................. viii 
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................. ix 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................. xi 
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS .................................................................................... xiii 
ABSTRAK ............................................................................................................... xiv 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................. xvi 
 
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Importance of the Topic ........................................................................................ 1 
1.2. Background of the Topic ....................................................................................... 4 
1.3. Problem Statement ................................................................................................ 6 
1.4. Theoritical Discussion ......................................................................................... 10 
1.5. Research Questions……………………………………………………………..12 
1.6. Research Objectives…………………………………………………………….13 
1.7. Methodology……………………………………………………………………13 
       1.7.1. Theory and Case Study…………………………………………………..15 
       1.7.2. Data Collection…………………………………………………………..17 
       1.7.3. Data Analysis…………………………………………………………….18 
1.8. Research Outline………………………………………………………………..21 
 
CHAPTER TWO - LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORITICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
2.1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………….. 23 
2.2. Natural Resources and Political Economy; Lessons from Different Countries... 24 
       2.2.1. Resource Abundance: Blessing or Curse in Terms of Economy?.............24 
v 
 
       2.2.2. Re-Visiting of the Rentier State Theory…………………………………27  
2.3. Rentier State Theory; Difinitation and Components ........................................... 30 
2.4. The Curse of Natural Resources in Terms of Politics ......................................... 38 
2.5. Robert Dahl: From Ideal to Real Democracy ..................................................... 45 
2.6. Larry Diamond: Civil Society and Accountability ............................................. 47 
2.7. Oil Rents in Iran’s Politics and Economy ........................................................... 51 
        2.7.1. Oil Rents and Iran’s Political Economy: Rent-Seeking Activities and        
        MilitaryGroups…………………………………………………………………52 
        2.7.2. Oil Wealth: Two-Way Road Between Politics and Economy ................. 57 
        2.7.3. Oil Rents in Iran’s Economy: Where is the Curse? ................................. 61 
2.8. Democratization Process in Iran: Obstacles and Shortcomings .......................... 63 
2.9. Summary ............................................................................................................. 69 
 
CHAPTER THREE : IRAN as a RENTIER STATE; HISTORICAL PROCESS 
and ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
3.1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 73 
3.2. Historical Process; How Oil Became Governmental Rents? .............................. 73 
       3.2.1. The Beginning of an Unfinished Story ..................................................... 73 
       3.2.2. Nationalization of Iran’s Oil Industry ....................................................... 76 
       3.2.3. Cope Against Dr.Mosaddegh and the Fall of the Nationalization                 
       Movement ........................................................................................................... 78 
       3.2.4. Oil Rents in the Iranian Government’s Hands .......................................... 79 
3.3. New Political Structure; New Political Economy ............................................... 83 
       3.3.1. Stablishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran ............................................ 83 
       3.3.2. Constitutional Distribution of Power and the Role of Iran’s Supreme          
       Leader .................................................................................................................. 84 
       3.3.3. Iran’s Political Economy ........................................................................... 89 
       3.3.4. Government Institution in Iran’s Energy Sector ....................................... 92 
vi 
 
        3.3.5. The Share of Oil in Iranian Economy ...................................................... 96 
        3.3.6. Taxation System and the Rentierism ..................................................... 103 
3.4. Summary ........................................................................................................... 108 
 
CHAPTER FOUR : OIL RENTS, DEMOCRACY and MILITARY GROUPS 
4.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 110 
4.2. Reformist Movement and Decline in Oil Revenues ......................................... 111 
4.3. Oil and Political Challenges Between Reformists and Conservatives .............. 116 
4.4. Higher Oil Income and Lower Level of Democracy ........................................ 123 
4.5. The Green Movement: Peak of Violence and Oil Prices .................................. 127 
4.6. Social Freedom and Oil Revenue ...................................................................... 132 
4.7. Oil Rents, Democracy and Military Expenditures ............................................ 135 
        4.7.1. The IRGC: The Transition from Millitary Force to Political Party ....... 136 
        4.7.2. Oil Revenue and Government Expenditure on the Military Sector ....... 143 
4.8. Summary ........................................................................................................... 147 
 
CHAPTER FIVE : OIL INCOME and GOVERNMENT COMPONENTS 
5.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 149 
5.2. The World Bank and the Four Government Components ................................ 149 
5.3. Rule of Law (RL) .............................................................................................. 152 
        5.3.1. Oil Stabilization Fund (OSF) and Rule of Law ..................................... 153 
5.4. Control of Corruption (CC) ............................................................................... 159 
5.5. Voice and Accounability (VA) ......................................................................... 166 
5.6. Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PV) ............................................. 172 
5.7. Summary ........................................................................................................... 177 
 
CHAPTER SIX : CONCLUSION 
6.1. Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 179 
vii 
 
6.2. Suggestions for Future Works ........................................................................... 184 
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................... 185 
APPENDICES ........................................................................................................ 221 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
   Page 
Table 1.1      Applied variables in existing literatures about                                    9 
Table 3.1      Oil production and direct income of Iran 1926-1932                         75                                         
Table 3.2      Iran’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 1997 to 2010                102 
Table 3.3      Iran’s government revenue based on CBI’s report                             106 
Table 5.1      List of some resource funds all over the world after 2000                 155    
Table 5.2      Brief report on the findings of this chapter                                         178 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
                                                                                                                                         
                                    Page  
Figure 1.1       Methodological process of this study                                               14 
Figure 2.1       A summary of the rentier state theory and its mechanism               36 
Figure 2.2       Corruption and natural resources (all countries)                              44 
Figure 2.3       The theoretical framework of this study                                           71    
Figure 3.1       Shared petroleum taxation revenues between British and                77                       
Iranian governments from 1934 to 1949   
Figure 3.2       Real per capita GDP growth and inflation in Iran                            80 
Figure 3.3       Distribution of power in the Islamic Republic of Iran                      85   
based on the Constitution written in1979 
Figure 3.4       The actual flow of the Supreme Leader’s power in Islamic             88    
Republic of Iran      
Figure 3.5       Governmental entities relative to Iran’s oil industry                        94               
(Explained  by the author according to Iran’s                        
Constitution 1979) 
Figure 3.6       Ten richest crude oil reserves in the world                                       97 
Figure 3.7       Top proven world oil reserves                                                          98   
Figure 3.8        International oil price between1997-2010                                       100  
Figure 3.9        Iran’s revenue from oil exports between1997-2010,                       101 
based on  Central Bank of Iran’s report    
Figure 3.10      The share of non-oil gross domestic product and oil gross             103             
 domestic product in the total Iran’s GDP 1997-2010   
Figure 3.11      Iran’s tax revenue in comparison with the world and the               105     
 European Union  
Figure 4.1        Iran’s Polity IV and Oil Revenues (Milliard Rial)                          114 
Figure 4.2        Freedom House’s scores for Iran and oil revenues                         133 
(Milliard Rial)         
x 
 
Figure 4.3        The IRGC’s organizational chart                                                    138 
Figure 4.4        Total active military manpower between1990–2010                      144 
Figure 4.5        Iran’s oil revenue, military expenditure as a percentage                 145          
of the GDP and military expenditure as a percentage of                          
central government expenditure from 1997 to 2010 
Figure 5.1        Oil income and Rule of Law in Iran 1997-2010                              152 
Figure 5.2        Oil income and Control of Corruption in Iran 1997-2010               160 
Figure 5.3        Iran’s economic freedom in comparison with the world from         165             
1997 to 2010  
Figure 5.4       Oil income and Voice and Accountability in Iran 1997-2010          167 
Figure 5.5       Oil income and Political Stability and Lack of Violence in              173  
Iran 1997-2010  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AIOC         Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
BP              British Petroleum 
BPOC 
CBI 
 
CC 
 
EF 
British Petroleum Oil Companies 
Central Bank of Iran 
Control of Corruption 
Economic Freedom 
 
FFYDP 
GDP 
 
GIO 
 
IMF 
Fourth Five-Year Development Plan 
Gross Domestic Product 
General Inspection Office 
International Monetary Fund 
 
IRGC 
IRI 
 
MENA 
 
NATO 
 
NIOC 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
Islamic Republic of Iran 
Middle East and North Africa 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
National Iranian Oil Company 
 
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries  
OSF Oil Stabilization Fund  
PV Political Stability and Absence of Violence  
RL Rule of Law  
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute  
SNSC Supreme National Security Council  
TFYDP Third Five-Year Development Plan  
xii 
 
US                   United States 
VA 
WGI 
Voice & Accountability 
Worldwide Governance Indicator 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiii 
 
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 
 
1- Hassan Gholipour Fereidoun, Usama Zuhair Al-mulali, and Youhanna Najdi. 
(2014). The Interaction between Globalization Indicators and International 
Tourism Arrivals in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Countries. 
Anatolia, 1-10. 
 
2- Hassan Gholipour Fereidouni, Youhanna Najdi, and Reza Ekhtiari Amiri. (2013). 
Do Governance Factors Matter for Happiness in the MENA Region?. 
International Journal of Social Economics, 40 (12), 1028-1040. 
 
3- Youhanna Najdi, and Mohd Azhari Bin Abdul Karim. (2012). The Role of the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Future of Democracy in 
Iran: Will Oil Income Influence the Process?. Democracy and Security Journal, 
8(1), 72-89. 
 
4- Hassan Gholipour Fereidouni, Behzad Foroughi, Reza Tajaddini, Youhanna 
Najdi. (2015). Expenditures on sport facilities and success in Iran: the resource 
curse hypothesis. Journal of Policy Modeling, Accepted for publication.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiv 
 
SEWAAN MINYAK DAN DEMOKRASI DI IRAN 1997-2010; PENELITIAN 
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ABSTRAK 
Iran, negara yang kaya dengan sumber tetapi mengalami masalah sistem 
demokrasi yang amat teruk. Penyelidikan ini bertujuan mengkaji kesan daripada 
pulangan minyak terhadap demokrasi di Iran, dalam tempoh  1997 – 2010. Justeru, 
penulis meneliti semula teori  kerajaan dan menerapkannya dalam  keadaan semasa 
di Iran untuk menjelaskan bagaimana kekayaan atau kemewahan minyak telah 
membantutkan atau menghalang proses demokerasi di Iran. Satu penyelidikan 
kualitatif dijalankan dengan menggunakan pendekatan kajian kes dan analisis 
konteks. Data sekunder dikumpul daripada laporan rasmi kerajaan Iran dan juga 
laporan daripada pertubuhan antarabangsa yang boleh dipercayai. Dalam seksyen 
pertama kajian ini, terbukti bahawa Iran dapat dikategorikan sebagai negara 
penyewa, berdasarkan definisi teori dan keperluan utamanya. Syer perolehan atau 
pendapatan minyak dalam ekonomi Iran, peranan marginal daripada sistem 
percukaian, dan pemilikan industri minyak diketengahkan dalam konteks ini. 
Sepanjang kajian ini, dikenal pasti bahawa terdapat perkaitan yang negatif di antara 
pendapatan minyak dan demokrasi di Iran. Dalam kata lain, kejutan harga minyak 
yang positif atau tinggi menyebabkan terhalangnya proses demokrasi. Sebaliknya, 
pulangan minyak yang sedikit, mendorong pemulihan atau pembaharuan politik Iran. 
Keputusan kajian juga menunjukkan bahawa kekayaan minyak mampu membantu 
kerajaan kekal berkuasa terutamanya disebabkan sokongan jitu daripada pihak IRGC 
(Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), yang merupakan kuasa ketenteraan atau 
militari utama di Iran.  Dapatan ini juga, khususnya, selaras dengan  teori negara 
xv 
 
penyewa, yang menegaskan tentang pentingnya kumpulan militari  dalan negara 
penyewa. Di samping itu, penulis juga menganalisis kesan negatif daripada pulangan 
minyak kerana ia dikaitkan dengan tiga indikator atau petunjuk kerajaan, iaitu  
Kedaulatan Undang-undang, Kawalan Rasuah dan ketidakstabilan politik dan 
kekurangan jenayah.  Sementara itu, ditemui juga bahawa Suara dan Akauntabiliti 
tidak mempunyai kaitan dengan kekayaan minyak Iran. Sebagai kesimpulan, dapat 
dirumuskan bahawa, berdasarkan teori negara penyewa, kekayaan minyak  mampu 
meningkatkan peranan militari dan kumpulan para-militari di Iran, dalam tempoh 
1997 - 2010, yang mempunyai pengaruh negatif terhadap proses demokrasi, kawalan 
rasuah, dan kedaulatan undang-undang. 
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OIL RENTS AND DEMOCRACY IN IRAN 1997-2010; RE-VISITING THE 
RENTIER STATE THEORY 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Iran is a resource-rich country that severely suffers from a lack of democracy. 
The purpose of the present research is to study the effect of oil revenues on 
democracy in Iran from 1997 to 2010. In order to do so, the author re-visited the 
rentier state theory and applied it to Iran’s present condition to explain how oil 
wealth has hindered the democratization process in Iran. A qualitative research was 
conducted using the case study approach and content analysis. The secondary data 
was collected from official reports of the Iranian government as well as from reports 
of reliable international organizations. In the first section of this study it is evidenced 
that Iran can be categorized as a rentier state, based on the definition of the theory 
and its vital requirements. The share of oil income in Iran’s economy, marginal role 
of taxation system, and government ownership of the oil industry were highlighted in 
this context. Throughout the study, it was identified that there is a negative 
relationship between oil income and democracy in Iran. In other words, positive oil 
price shocks hindered the democratization process, while less oil revenue led to 
political reforms. The results of the study also demonstrated that oil wealth has 
helped the government to stay in the power largely due to the major support of the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is the main military power in the 
country. This finding, in particular, was in the line with the rentier state theory which 
emphasized the importance of military groups in rentier states. The author also 
analyzed the negative effects of oil revenue as it pertained to three government 
indicators including the Rule of Law, Control of Corruption and Political Instability 
xvii 
 
and Lack of Violence; Whereas, Voice and Accountability were found to have no 
relationship to oil wealth in Iran. Finally, it was concluded that, according to the 
rentier state theory, oil wealth caused an increase the role of military and Para-
military groups in Iran from 1997 to 2010 which had a negative influence on the 
country’s democratization process, control of corruption, and rule of law.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Importance of the Topic 
Democracy, as one of the most important concepts in political science 
remarkably has attracted the attention of scholars, particularly since World War II. 
Existing literature has considered democracy from various perspectives. For 
example, the main elements of democratic governments such as political and civil 
freedom, rule of law, equality, quality of institutions, political competition, free and 
fair election as well as fair judiciary system have extensively been discussed in 
several studies (See for example Dahl, 1971; Huntington, 1991; Diamond, 2002; 
Howard and Roessler, 2006, Gerring et al., 2012; Woodberry, 2012; Gassebner et al., 
2013). 
In spite of various viewpoints about democracy, current scholars are most 
concerned with finding obstacles that may hinder or challenge transition to 
democracy. Particularly, their research highlights the relationship between natural 
resources and a country‘s quality of government. 
Since the late 1980s, a sizable body of scholarly literature has argued that an 
abundance of natural resources increases the possibility of poor economic 
performance (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004; Stijns, 2005), 
civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; 2005; Fearon, 2004; Ross, 2004) and 
contributes to low levels of democracy (Ross, 1999; Bulte and Damania, 
2005; Cuaresma et al., 2011). Indeed, by using both empirical and theoretical 
approaches, these researchers illustrated that natural resources is a curse rather than a 
blessing.  
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Thus, studies about resource-rich countries such as Iran became an interesting 
topic for researchers in both political and economic fields all over the world. Iran is a 
member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
1
 and the 
third richest country after Venezuela and Saudi Arabia (OPEC, 2001), as it has 
around 154 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves. It is worth noting that the 
first major oil field in Iran was discovered at the south of the country in Masjid 
Soleiman city in 1908 and since that time, historically, oil has played a crucial role in 
Iran‘s politics and economy. Another major factor that contributed to Iran and other 
oil-exporting countries successes in the oil business is the European Industrial 
Revolution, which led to an international demand for oil, which soon became known 
as ―Black Gold‖. This major turning point in history led to the necessity of oil, not 
only for Iran and oil-exporting countries but also for the rest of the world. 
In examining the sociopolitical impact of oil, some key issues such as oil 
incomes and government spending should also be taken into account. The 
importance of oil income has been emphasized by Iran‘s new government which 
came into being after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. This critical event led the 
government shifting from strong relationships with western countries into concepts 
of self-dependence and self-sufficiency both in politics and economics. By a short 
glance on Iran‘s government, it can be distinguished that as the only country with 
Shi‘ism religion in the world, its political structure clearly relies on the oil sector and 
hence, this issue makes it a special case in terms of politics and political economy.  
Therefore, with regard to the importance of the topic, two issues can be 
considered. First of all, this study aims to uncover the impact of political economy on 
                                                 
1
 The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) created on September 10–14, 1960 
during the Baghdad Conference, by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. OPEC tries to 
secure stable and fair prices for petroleum producers.  
(See http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm) [Accessed 15 January 2015] 
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democracy in Iran, specifically focusing on the effects of oil income fluctuations. It 
should take into account that based on estimations of some international 
organizations like the International Energy Agency (IEA), demands for oil will be 
around 175 million barrels per day by 2030. This situation means that for oil-
exporting countries like Islamic Republic of Iran, the clear and hidden impacts of 
natural resource revenues are a kind of durable question not only for today, but also 
for the future. 
Secondly, this study focuses on the time period between1997-2010, which 
includes the two main recent democratic movements of the Iranian people. The first 
of which happened during the seventh Presidential election on 23 May 1997 
(2
nd
Khordad month in Persian calendar); the second democratic event was the 
―Green Movement‖ which originated from the tenth Presidential election in June 
2009. Interestingly, Iran‘s economy experienced both negative and positive oil price 
shocks throughout the period of this study between1997 and 2010, and for this 
reason, research about the impact of oil incomes on democracy in this period may 
cover the effects of both ups and downs of oil revenue on levels of democracy in 
Iran.  
 The central argument of this thesis is the relationship between oil incomes as 
an external rents and democracy in Iran throughout the time period between1997 to 
2010. While economists have considered the effect of oil revenue on Iran‘s 
democracy through the lenses of economic theories such ―Dutch Disease‖ and 
―Resource Curse‖ examining the political impacts of oil wealth on political field 
needs a theory that is related to politics, not economics. Along this line, the main 
theory in the field of political economy and natural resources is the ―rentier state‖ 
which can be briefly summarized as describing those countries with windfall oil rents 
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that do not feel the need to incorporate taxation systems which leads to long-lasting 
problems such as weak institutions, corruption, and low level of rule of law, 
accountability and mismanagements. Gradually, these conditions deteriorate 
government components and democratization.  
By using the rentier state theory, this study analyzes Iran, one of the most 
resource-rich countries in the world, in order to find out the role that oil rents plays 
as an obstacle to democratization in this country; moreover, how the current Iranian 
government uses these revenues to stay in power despite its weak institutions. 
 
1.2. Background of the Topic 
In the contemporary history of Iran before the period of this study, two 
democratic revolutions led to two major revolutions; the first of which was the 
Constitutional Revolution from 1905 to 1907 under the leadership of political elites 
and intellectuals to modernize the Qajar dynasty and limit the authority of the 
monarchy. The movement also emphasized that the rule of law and establishment of 
the fair and modern judiciary system needed to be based on the Western model. The 
revolution finally led to the establishment of the Iranian parliament and the first 
Constitution in 1907 (Faghfoory, 1987; Najmabadi, 1996). 
The second democratic movement was the Islamic Revolution in 1979 under 
the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1982). Although Mohammad 
Reza Shah (1919-1980), the last king of the Pahlavi dynasty, had increased the 
availability of education, expanded industry, modernized the military sector, 
improved economic structures and provided better infrastructure, as some researchers 
have mentioned, he did not pay enough attention to political reform and the 
5 
 
democratic demands of the Iranian people (Keddie, 1998; Nasr, 2000; Kamali, 2007; 
Schayegh, 2010).  
Nonetheless, in political fields during the 1960s and 1970s, Mohammad Reza 
Shah expanded the role of the Iranian government‘s internal security system, the 
National Intelligence and Security Organization, to suppress opposition groups and 
dissident political activists like clergymen, university students and intellectuals. In 
response to this measure, the Islamic revolution and its leaders strongly emphasized 
political concepts like independence, equality and freedom during political rallies 
and public demonstrations. As a result, the Iranian people‘s desire for a better quality 
of government and higher levels of democracy shifted public favor to the leadership 
of Ayatollah Khomeini. 
In the contemporary history of Iran, for the first time, oil and politics became 
inextricably linked to each other in 1951 when Iran‘s oil industry was nationalized 
during the Pahlavi Dynasty under the leadership of Iran‘s Prime Minister Dr. 
Mohammad Mosaddegh (1882-1967). The government controlled all operations 
related to Iran‘s oil industry, including exploration, development and exploitation 
(See for example Ramazani, 1962, Abrahamian, 1982). Following the fall of the 
Pahlavi Dynasty and establishment the Islamic Republic, the new government 
became the official owner of all natural resources, according to Article 44 of Iran‘s 
Constitution 1979. In addition, coming to the power of reformist and conservative 
groups have not changed this condition.   
In reality, although nationalization of Iran‘s oil industry in 1951 prevented 
other countries from interfering with Iran‘s oil sector, it also made Iran‘s government 
the official owner of all of Iran‘s oil resources. This condition is still in place today 
in the Islamic Republic and continues to affect the Iranian people. Consequently, as 
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Acemoglu et al. (2004) argued, the nationalization of oil industry not only makes the 
government the richest organization in the country but also provides a vast amount of 
autonomy for the government to implement laws over the people and taxation 
mechanism. Robinson et al. (2006) have broadly explained that when this situation 
happens, the main results of this condition in terms of the government are low level 
of accountability, weakness of political institutions and lack of a taxation system.  
These results are clearly evidenced in Iran‘s political and economic history.  
After the nationalization movement in Iran in 1951, the GDP per capita growth rate 
increased to 8% per year from 1963 to 1976 (Esfahani and Pesaran, 2008) and 
guaranteed the autocrat power of Pahlavi Dynasty until the Islamic Revolution in 
1979 (Farzanegan and Schneider, 2009). This trend has continued until present day 
in the Islamic Republic where the government is still the official the owner of energy 
industries while the country continues to suffer from low levels of democracy and 
freedom.   
 
1.3. Problem Statement 
For many years, people debated that the possession of a sizable natural 
resource endowment is a major advantage for rapid development in different areas 
for resource-rich countries (Viner, 1953; Lewis, 1955; Higgins, 1968). Before the 
1980s, several studies argued that natural resources would enable developing 
countries in transitioning from underdevelopment to industrialization situation 
(Rostow, 1961). Some of these researchers put forward similar arguments, finding 
that a natural resource endowment would facilitate an industrial development by 
providing investible funds (Balassa, 1980; Krueger, 1980).   
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However, since the late 1980s, several scholars have challenged these 
viewpoints, arguing that reliance on natural resource exports has undeniable 
disadvantages. In fact, their main assertion was that natural resource abundance is 
strongly associated with negative social, economic and political results, including 
civil war and internal conflicts, poor economic performance, as well as a low levels 
of democracy (Gelb and Associates, 1988; Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Wantchekon, 
1999; Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001; Davis et al., 2003). 
In this framework, while Iran is a resource-rich country, the religious extremist 
regime in Iran and several human crises have raised concerns about the political 
condition of the country since the inception of the Islamic Republic in 1979. From a 
political perspective, reports from international organizations and recent democratic 
movements in Iran have clearly revealed that the country strongly suffers from the 
low level of democracy and human rights crises (Freedom House 2011; 2012; 
Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). More importantly, two recent democratic movements -
one in 1997 and another in 2009- revealed that the Iranian people have pursued 
democracy, not only for the purpose of instating a better quality of government, but 
also to solve different economic and political problems, such as unemployment, 
poverty, gender inequality as well as an alarmingly high rate of drugs (Karbassian, 
2000; Amuzegar, 2004; 2005; Ilias, 2008; Karimi, 2008; Esfahani and Pesaran, 2009; 
Safdari et al., 2011). 
Thus, researchers have paid attention to the roots of the lack of democracy in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran from a variety of perspectives; for instance, the 
structural challenge between tradition and modernity (Bashiriyyeh, 2002), the lack of 
civil society (Saeia, 2007), rent-seeking behavior of Iranian military groups 
(Alfoneh, 2008), as well as the governmental narrative from the political role of 
8 
 
religion (Karimi, 2012). Moreover, Kurman (1999), Gasiorowski (2002) and Keddie 
(2003) clearly emphasized the political challenges among Iranian political groups, 
particularly conservatives and reformists, as one of the main causes of political crisis 
in the country. None of these aforementioned studies acknowledged the role of oil in 
Iran‘s political power. In addition, there is a very limited amount of research 
regarding the influence of oil income on Iran‘s politics and economy, specifically in 
terms of its effect on political structure. However, some researchers have illustrated 
the relationship among the fluctuation of oil revenues and both negative and positive 
oil price shocks on economic growth, government expenditure and factionalism in 
Iran (Farzanegan et al., 2001; Bjorvatn and Selvik 2007; Esfahani et al., 2013). 
However, most existing studies about the effect of oil revenues on Iran‘s 
political field are outdated and focused on the pre-Islamic era, like Mahdavy (1970); 
they are not comprehensive and just cover limited elements like Amuzagar (2008), 
Zahirinejad (2010) and Najdi and Azhari (2012), or did not pay enough attention to 
the role of oil like Hen-Tov and Gonzalez (2011), Hen-Tov (2006) and Kamrava 
(2007). Table 1.1 briefly shows that there is still a gap in the literature about the 
impact of oil revenues on the level of democracy in Iran because no research has yet 
been conducted. 
As can be found from table 1.1 researchers, particularly economists, have 
broadly estimated the impact of oil price volatility on Iran‘s economic field while 
political scientists have neglected its effect on both the level of democracy and the 
main indicators of the government (like Rule of Law, Control of Corruption, Voice 
and Accountability, Political Stability and Lack of Violence) which shows whether 
the government is democratic or not.  
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Table 1.1. Applied variables in existing literatures about (Created by the author of this thesis) 
Reference 
Economic 
Growth and GDP 
Government 
expenditure 
Factionalism Unemployment 
Foreign 
policy 
Housing 
investment 
Inflation 
Bjorvatn & Selvik 
(2007) 
       
Amuzegar (2008)        
Esfahani & Pesaran 
(2008) 
       
Maleki (2009)        
Farzanegan & 
Markwardt (2009) 
       
Farzanegan & 
Schneider (2009) 
       
Arman & Aghajari 
(2009) 
       
Moradi (2009)        
Gholipour Fereidouni 
(2010) 
       
Zahirinejad (2010)        
Mehrara & Dehkarsalari 
(2011) 
       
Farzanegan et al. (2011)        
Farzanegan (2011)        
Mehrara et al. (2011)        
Safdari et al. (2011)        
Dizaji (2012)        
Mehrabadi et al. (2012)        
Esfahani et al. (2013)        
Garkaz et al. (2012)        
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Therefore, it is necessary to concentrate on this problem more comprehensively 
by using new data from both the government and international organizations, 
especially because of the recent changes in Iran‘s government. By applying new 
statistics and theory, this study aims to uncover the relationship between oil revenue 
and the level of democracy in Iran; moreover, it strives to illuminate how the 
windfall revenue from oil exports has enabled the Islamic government to remain in 
power, despite its weak institutions.   
 
1.4. Theoretical Discussion 
There are some political economy theories that have explained the effects of 
natural resources on economic and political performance of governments. For 
instance, ―Dutch Disease‖ is defined as a condition whereby a windfall profit from a 
natural resource price shock dramatically increases the real exchange rate, which 
negatively affects manufacturing and the tradable sector which also leads to high 
inflation in the non-tradable sector of resource-rich countries (Bruno and Sachs, 
1982; Corden, 1984).
2
 
Although the concept of ―Dutch disease‖ was first coined in Netherlands 
following the discovery of gas reserves at the beginning of 1960s, it is still one of the 
most important theories contemporaneously, and many scholars have identified this 
problem in other countries (See for example Sachs and Warner, 1995; Gylfason, 
2001a; Hausmann and Rigobon, 2002; Fielding, 2007; Beine et al., 2012).    
The ―resource curse‖ is another famous theory which emphasizes the paradox 
that oil-dependent countries tend to have lower economic growth in comparison with 
                                                 
2
 Some scholars have discussed that Dutch Disease can be traced to foreign exchange inflows 
in the form of international aid or loans, see for example: Adam and Bevan (2003), Nkusu (2004) and 
Rajan and Subramanian (2005). 
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other countries that do not possess this natural resource. The theory hypothesizes that 
the mismanagement of huge revenues from natural resources and a deep reliance on 
these incomes makes the government incredibly vulnerable to the volatility of oil 
income. The ―resource curse‖ theory has been applied in analyses of many different 
countries; it is commonly understood an expected among economists that possession 
of natural resources is a ―curse‖ for developing countries rather than a ―blessing‖ 
(See for instance Wheeler, 1984; Gelb and Associates, 1988; Auty 2004; Ross, 2012; 
Wenar, 2013; Holden, 2013; Torres et al, 2013). 
While these theories are necessary for understanding the influence of natural 
resources, both are constructed from the economic perspective rather than the 
political perspective. For this reason, this study aims to apply the ―rentier state‖ 
theory which assert the relationship between external rents, such as oil and gas 
revenues, and the political performance, particularly democracy. Indeed, this thesis 
will visit the rentier state theory in Iran as a case study while also investigating the 
volatility of this rent on the main elements of the government. In doing so, firstly, 
this study will broadly discuss whether or not the rentier state theory is compatible 
with Iran; secondly, this study will analyze the effects of oil rent on democracy in 
Iran.    
The present study will focus on the rentier state theory to describe the 
relationship between oil rents and democracy in Iran from 1997 to 2010. Using the 
rentier state theory will help the author of this study to evaluate the effect of oil in 
Iran‘s political field more comprehensively and from a variety of perspectives such 
as democracy, freedom, control of corruption, voice and accountability, rule of law 
as well as the role of military groups. 
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Viewed from the political economy perspective, although the rentier state 
theory is more compatible to study about natural resource and democratization, 
interestingly the existing literature about Iran shows that scholars have not pay 
attention to this viewpoint. Therefore, this study will try to fill this gap in existing 
literature by applying the rentier state theory to analyze the main characteristics and 
elements of Iran‘s government in terms of its political economy.   
Additionally, among different definitions of democracy and its required 
elements, this study will concentrate on the factors which have been addressed by 
Robert Dahl (1976) and Lary Diamond and Leonardo Morlino (2004). They have 
emphasized similar components required to create democratic structures such as free, 
competitive and fair elections, rule of law, quality of institutions, broader standards 
of good governance including transparency, accountability, as well as lack of 
corruption.  
Although political scientists have identified other main and marginal factors 
necessary for democracy, this study will investigate the level of democracy and 
quality of government in Iran based on Dahl (1976), Diamond and Leonardo Morlino 
(2004). 
 
1.5. Research Questions 
This study aims to apply the rentier state theory to understand the connection 
between oil wealth and democracy in Iran from 1997 to 2010. Briefly, the theory 
emphasizes that in rentier states, rents come from abroad and the economy of these 
countries strongly depends on rents. Moreover, each rentier state‘s government has 
control over these rents.  
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Therefore, according to the rentier state theory, the main questions of this study 
can be framed as follows: 
1. What are the characteristics of a rentier state that can be found in Iran? 
2. What is the effect of oil rents on democracy in Iran from 1997 to 2010? 
3. What is the effect of oil rents on government components (including Rule of 
Law, Voice and Accountability, Control of Corruption as well as Political 
Stability and Lack of Violence) in Iran from 1997 to 2010?  
 
1.6. Research Objectives 
By using the rentier state theory, the main objective of this study is to 
investigate the effects of oil revenues in regard to the level of Iran‘s democracy and 
in terms of the four major elements of the government: rule of law, voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, as well as control of 
corruption in Iran between1997 to 2010. Therefore, the objectives of this study are: 
1. To describe the mechanism that makes Iran‘s government a rentier state. 
2. To investigate the impact of oil revenue on democracy in Iran. 
3. To understand why the Iranian government is able to avoid democracy and 
deactivate democratic movements. 
4. To find out the origins of the close relationship between Iran‘s core of the 
power and military groups. 
 
1.7. Methodology 
This thesis uses qualitative research methods which seek to deal with realities 
of social science rather than artificially constructed data in quantitative analysis 
(Manheim et al., 2002: 137; Gummesson, 2005). For instance, Morrow et al. (2001: 
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582-583) have emphasized that the qualitative method is an ideal tool when 
conducting multicultural research more so than in other fields of social science. The 
present study is a qualitative research in the field of political economy. It employs 
the specific case study (Iran) with time boundaries (1997-2010). The purpose of the 
research is to find reliable data and information that may show the effects of oil in 
the democratization process in Iran, specifically from 1977 to 2010. The full 
description of the research process has been more fully recounted in figure 1.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Methodological process of this study 
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As can be seen in this figure, after choosing the theory, the author has collected 
and analyzed data in order to answer research questions, and uncover the effect of oil 
revenues on democracy in Iran. Data collection, data analysis, theory and case study 
of this research will be broadly defined in the following sections.  
 
 
1.7.1. Theory and Case Study  
Using theory is a common tool in qualitative research. Yin (1993) has 
emphasized that a given theory may help the author to increase the validity of his or 
her study if the theory is formulated clearly. In this regard, the formulation strongly 
depends on the relationship between case study and variables of the research. As 
Walsham (1995) has presented, theory has at least three different applications in 
qualitative research: to show the design and collection of data, to illustrate the best 
approach when interpreting results, and last but not least, to support the relationship 
between the case study and the presented argument.  
Indeed, while scholars in quantitative studies test theories at the beginning of 
research (Bryman and Bell, 2007), applying of a theory can be addressed as a vital 
feature of qualitative research which affects the whole of study (Gummesson, 2005). 
Furthermore, Finn (2000:14) has noted that using theory not only increases the value 
and validity of research but also it is intensively necessary to present analysis and 
interpretation as well as to modify the previous works, which are relevant to the 
study.        
Therefore, this study aims to analyze the current research questions from the 
perspective of the rentier state theory, which is one of the most valuable theories in 
political economic research. Although the rentier state theory has been used to visit 
some resource-rich countries, it has not yet been applied to Iran‘s economy after the 
16 
 
Islamic revolution, which is one of the richest countries in terms of natural resources, 
particularly that of oil and gas. This study uses the rentier state theory to not only 
describe whether the theory applies to Iran as a case study, but also it helps the 
author to illustrate the effects of oil incomes on Iran‘s political economy more 
comprehensively.  
As aformentioned, the Islamic Republic of Iran is the case study of this 
research. ―Case study‖ is broadly accepted as a research strategy in social science. 
Several scholars have methodologically emphasized on the importance of case study 
research, which has remarkably increased its popularity (Ragin and Becker, 1992; 
Thomas, 2011; and Creswell, 2013; Merriam, 2014). Yin (2004) has emphasized that 
the significance of employing the case study method in research is its ability to 
examine a specific case within its real-life context.  More recently, Creswell (2013: 
97) has also pointed out the benefits of the case study approach in that it clearly 
explores a real-life, contemporary-bounded system over time through the use of in-
depth data collection that utilize multiple sources of evidence and statistics.    
Generally, a given case study provides the major vehicle for investigation in 
the interpretive tradition (Walsham, 1993: 14); it also helps one to discover the roots 
of specific problems, not only for the purpose of the case study, but also to reveal 
how these problems might apply to other countries and regions (Lee, 1989; Galliers, 
1991) and makes a comprehensive strategy to assess and interpret social phenomena 
(Montealegre, 1995). Furthermore, the case study strategy helps to expand existing 
theories (Eisenhardt, 1989) because of its particularly insightful focus on the details 
of a process in specific context (Hartley, 2004). All of these advantages have led to 
the growing confidence in the case study strategy, particularly in qualitative research 
studies (Hatrley, 2004: 323).  
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Importantly, as Yin (1994: 7) has noted, the type of research questions used in 
a study is the first and most important element to consider when deciding which 
research strategy to apply. He also has added that case study research questions 
typically seeks to answer ―Who,‖ ―What,‖ ―Where,‖ ―How,‖ as well as ―Why,‖ of 
their studies (See also Townes and Shavelson, 2002: 106). The present study has 
analyzed the questions of ―What‖ and ―How‖ in regard to Iran‘s political economy, 
and thus, the case study strategy can be addressed as method of this thesis. Yin 
(1994: 13) has divided case study researches into two groups. The first one is an 
―empirical inquiry‖ and the second is a ―case study inquiry.‖ The present study is a 
case study inquiry, which relies on multiple sources of data and utilizes theoretical 
frameworks to organize data collection and analysis. In other words, a theoretical 
framework improves consistency and the credibility of a case study, particularly in 
qualitative research.   
Briefly, Iran is the case study of this thesis and the rentier state theory has been 
used as its theoretical framework. Setting boundaries for the case, the study also 
covers Iran‘s political economy between1997 to 2010 because this time period 
includes two major recent democratic movements, both of which possess positive 
and negative international oil price shocks which, in turn, illustrate the relationship 
between oil wealth and democracy in Iran. 
 
1.7.2. Data Collection 
There are multiple ways to collect data in qualitative research, for instance, 
archival records, interviews, direct observation as well as documentary reviews. Yin 
(1994: 83) has identified six sources for collecting data in case study research: 
documents, direct observation, participant-observation, archival records, physical 
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artifacts, and interviews. Among them, the present thesis has applied documentation 
and interviews. In fact, the major strength of case study data collection is that it 
gathers and applies several different sources of data to get more convincing and 
accurate results.  
The present study has used secondary data, which uses sources such as official 
reports from Iran‘s government, annual reports of reliable international organizations 
(e.g. the World Bank, Freedom House, Polity IV and Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries called ―OPEC‖), and interviews with ten political scientists and 
political economists. In essence, statistics regarding Iran‘s economy and the role of 
oil in this country are obtained from Iran‘s government official reports; meanwhile, 
data about the level of democracy, freedom and quality of Iran‘s government have 
been collected from the Freedom House, World Bank, and Marshall and Jaggers‘s 
Polity IV project. Using both the governmental and international reports helps 
researchers understand the study from more comprehensive viewpoint and to 
compare data to a range of time periods (Hussey & Hussey, 1997, Bryman & Bell 
2007). 
          Additionally, data has been gathered for the purpose of this study from 
multiple litarature sources as well, including books and articles as well as credible 
websites. Moreover, some documents and interviews written and conducted in the 
Persian language have been translated to the English language. All political scientist 
and economist interviewees were selected because of their expertise and relevant 
publications in connection with the topic of this study. Interviews with these 
researchers were conducted through email and Skype; all interviewees answered in 
the English language. The author of this thesis has tried to access the official 
statistics reported by the Iranian government but the government does not publish 
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any official data about the relevant factors. For instance, no data about the 
government‘s revenue from taxation and also expenditure on military sector have 
been reported by Central Bank of Iran. Therefore, in order to study about these 
matters, the author of this study has referred to the statistics of the reliable 
international organizations such as the World Bank, Heritage Foundation as well as 
International Monetary Fund.      
 
1.7.3. Data Analysis 
Data analysis is a mechanism whereby a researcher organizes the materials that 
he or she has seen, heard, learned and read; moreover, it is a process that links data 
and theory and link the study to previous works (Glesne, 1999: 130). According to 
Lecompte and Schensul (1999), data analysis is a kind of mechanism that can be 
used to reduce complicated data and statistics into an attractive, new and clear story.  
As researchers have discussed, there are different approaches to analyzing data. 
For instance, Merriam (1998) has identified at least four models: constant 
comparative method, narrative analysis, ethnographic analysis and phenomenological 
analysis. Bernard (2000: 443) also has suggested multiple types of data analysis such 
as cross-cultural analysis, discourse analysis, hermeneutics or interpretive analysis, 
grounded theory analysis, narrative and performance analysis as well as content 
analysis. 
The present study uses content analysis as one of the most applicable 
approaches in the social science, particularly in political science. As Krippendorff 
(1980: 18) has indicated, content analysis is a kind of research technique wherein the 
researcher makes replicable and valid inferences from texts due to the contexts of 
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their use. Indeed, it is a scientific tool which can increase a researcher‘s knowledge 
of specific phenomena and provides new insights. 
Moreover, content analysis allows the researcher to process data and texts that 
are informative, reliable, meaningful and representational to others (Krippendorff, 
1980: 41). Thus, this mechanism can remarkably incorporate large volumes of data, 
particularly with case study and theoretical framework. Using content analysis, the 
present research aims to achieve some targets such as to link statistics to the rentier 
state theory, to survey existing literature reviews, to find the gap and useful source of 
data, to highlight the relationship between variables and theory which are applied in 
the research, and to categorize all data, events, interviews and documents throughout 
the study.  
In fact, in conducting a content analysis, the researcher discovers which 
documents are related to each section of the study and how to interpret them. 
Additionally, as Wesley (2010) has explained, in employing content analysis, 
scholars have more opportunities to use statistics, figures, tables and even matrixes, 
which are applied in the present study.  
Briefly summarized from methodological perspective, the present study uses 
the qualitative research approach that incorporates the case study focus as well as 
content analysis. The data used is considered to be ―secondary data,‖ which has been 
collected from official reports of Iran‘s government, annual reports of reliable 
international organizations, credible websites and documents. Furthermore, the 
author of this study conducted interviews with ten political scientists and political 
economists to gain valuable expert opinions and insights. (See the list of interviewees 
in APPENDIX A and equation of the answers in APPENDIX B). 
 
21 
 
1.8. Research Outline 
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter two is comprised of the 
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework. Chapter two explains the rentier state 
theory and shows how the previous works have applied this theory to investigate the 
effects of oil revenue on political field. The chapter also aims to show how previous 
scholars have revisited the rentier state theory in different countries and regions and 
what did the find in their researches? The chapter, additionally, illustrates the main 
elements of the rentier state theory which will be applied in the present study. 
Furthermore, most important studies related to the topic of this thesis have 
been mentioned in chapter two and then, the main similarities and differences among 
them have been highlighted. Finally, the chapter tries to show the gap in the existing 
literature that scholars have not considered to the effects of oil wealth on democracy 
in Iran, in particular, be revisiting the rentier state theory. Therefore, the present 
study tries to fill in this gap in the literature.   
Chapter three explains how and why Iran‘s government is the owner of oil and 
oil revenues. In doing so, this thesis focuses on Iran‘s Constitution 1979 and the 
mechanisms that put mass amounts of oil sector wealth in the hands of the 
government. 
Chapter four is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the 
relationship between oil income and the level of democracy. In fact, this section tries 
to show is there any correlation between the volatility of oil revenues and democracy 
in Iran from 1997 to 2010? In the second section, the author argues the close 
relationship and strategic ties between Iran‘s core of the power and its military 
groups, based on the rentier state theory which has been defined in chapter two. In 
fact, this argument reveals that oil incomes provide common interests for these two 
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sides and this condition has helped the government of Islamic Republic of Iran to 
survive for a long time despite fundamental problems in politics and economy.     
Chapter five evaluates the relationship between the fluctuation of oil incomes 
and the four main elements of Iran‘s government: voice and accountability, rule of 
law, control of corruption, and stability and absence of violence from 1997 to 2010. 
Finally, chapter six provides the conclusion, discusses the main findings of this 
study, and suggests new questions and points of interest for future study and inquiry. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 This chapter aims to review the most recent and important previous 
researches about the effects of natural resource, particularly oil, on the political 
economy of Iran and rest of the world. In doing so, the re-visiting the resource curse 
and rentier state theories for different countries will be discussed and then, the thesis 
will solely concentrate on Iran, as it is the case study of this dissertation.  
Firstly, this chapter defines the rentier state theory and then shows how the 
previous research had applied this theory to different countries and regions. In the 
next section, the focus of the chapter is on the existing literature about the effects of 
oil in Iranian politics and economy. Scholars have broadly considered the correlation 
between natural resources and economic variables in Iranian economy; however, 
they did not pay enough attention to the significant role of oil wealth in the 
democratization process in the country. Hence, the author of this study will describe 
how scholars have hitherto neglected the relationship between oil wealth and 
democracy in Iran. 
Therefore, the target of this chapter is to understand what researchers have 
found in the past about the correlation between natural resources and levels of 
democracy, not only in the case of Iran, but also for regions around the world. 
Moreover, the theoretical framework provides a clear guideline of the present thesis. 
Finally, by the conclusion of this chapter, it is expected that the gap between 
previous research and literatures will have been bridged to the present by the current 
theoretical framework of this study. 
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2.2. Natural Resources and Political Economy; Lessons from Different 
Countries   
 2.2.1. Resource Abundance: Blessing or Curse in Terms of Economy?   
The abundance and availability of natural resources in connection with politics 
and economy has broadly attracted the attentions of scholars for decades. Although 
economic historians have traditionally discussed how natural resources have 
endowed great benefits on a nation (Wrigley, 1988), there is now a paradoxical, yet 
common wisdom among economists that possession of these natural resources for 
developing countries is actually a curse, rather than a blessing (Lal and Myint, 1998; 
Auty, 2001a). 
Generally, there are three main theories about the effects of natural resources 
on politics and economy in resource-rich countries. The first one, ―Dutch disease,‖ 
comes from the Netherlands in the 1960s when the positive shock in the price of 
natural resources led to high inflation in non-tradable sectors and also economic 
depression, particularly in the manufacturing sectors of this country. Since that time, 
several studies have re-examined the Dutch disease theory in different resource-rich 
countries to find out whether these countries have been similarly affected by Dutch 
disease or not (Usui, 1997; Hjort, 2006; Égert, 2012; Dülger et al., 2013; Hasanov, 
2013; Van der Ploeg and Venables, 2013; Apergis et al., 2014; Benkhodja, 2014). 
The second theory, the ―resource curse,‖ argues that countries that have 
abundant natural resources experience lower economic growth and poorer economic 
performance in comparison with other countries that do not have these rents. Briefly, 
the resource curse says that natural resources, in fact, provide windfall cash for the 
rich countries as a result of it, the people‘s tendency to effort, creativity and 
